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THE LAWS OF UNINTENDED RESULTS
by
HON. W. DON READER'
Throughout history, the premises upon which the juvenile justice system
are based swing like a pendulum, from one extreme to the next, never stop-
ping in the middle. To understand why the pendulum never stops in the
middle, we must begin by examining the juvenile justice system in its histori-
cal context.
Two disparate philosophical themes emerge out of a developmental
review of the juvenile courts' history in the United States. One theme is of a
court of law for children with legal and procedural safeguards; the other is that
of the juvenile court as a social welfare agency with psycho-social remedies,
attempting to reform wayward youth. "Should we punish?" or "Should we
treat?" are questions that define the ambivalence and characterize the diffi-
culties the court has had in discharging its diverse role. Roscoe Pound put it
succinctly when he said, "The juvenile court is the illegitimate issue of an
illicit relationship between the legal profession and the social work profes-
sion, and now no one wants to claim the little bastard." 2
Prior to the juvenile justice movement, children were treated as chattels
of adults without any rights, and if found guilty of a crime they were sentenced
as any adult would be.3 Early reform groups did not accept the common no-
tion that such harsh treatment would result in the rehabilitation of delin-
quents.4 In fact, many believed the conditions of the adult prisons led juries
and judges to acquit the young, rather than send them to such inhuman places.5
1. Judge, Ohio Court of Appeals, Fifth Judicial District, Canton, Ohio. A.B. Dickinson
College; J. D. University of Akron School of Law. In 1980, Judge Reader was President of
the Ohio Association of Juvenile and Family Court Judges. Under his leadership, the juvenile
justice statutes were rewritten, resulting in what is now called the Ohio Plan. He has also
served as Vice Chairman of the Policy Advisory Group to the Department of Youth Services.
Judge Reader has testified before the Ohio General Assembly, the United States Congress,
and the judiciary committees in both the New Jersey and Nevada legislatures on issues relating
to juvenile law. In July, 1989, Judge Reader was elected President of the National Council of
Juvenile and Family Court Judges.
2. Although the exact source of this quote is unavailable, it is believed that Dean Pound
made this statement at an early American Bar Association convention where he spoke about
the juvenile court system.
3. W. DON READER & HELEN SACKS, HISTORY OF THE JUVENILE COURT, HANDBOOK OF
PSYCHIATRIC PRACTICE IN THE JUVENILE COURT 5 (1992). See also In re Mason, 28 P. 1025,
1026 (Wash. 1892) (an infant under age 16 can be sentenced to imprisonment if convicted of
a crime the same as an adult); see also JULIAN MACK, THE CHANCERY PROCEDURE IN THE
JUVENILE COURT IN THE CHILD, THE CLINIC, AND THE COURT 310 (1925).
4. See Kelly Keimig Elsea, The Juvenile Crime Debate: Rehabilitation, Punishment, or
Prevention, 5 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 135, 137 (1995).
5. See Susan K. Knipps, What is a "Fair" Response to Juvenile Crime?, 20 FORDHAM URB.
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The New York City House of Refuge, which opened in 1825, was the
first of these youth prisons.6 In a few years, other houses of refuge were es-
tablished that accepted children convicted of crimes, as well as destitute
youth.7 These facilities were advanced as preventive institutions designed to
accept children of unfit parents. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Exparte
Crouse8 stated:
The object of charity is reformation by training of inmates: by imbuing
their minds with principles of morality and religion; by furnishing them
with a means to earn a living, and above all, by separating them from the
corrupting influences of improper associates. To this end, may not the
natural parents when unequal to the task of education, or unworthy of it,
be superseded by the parens patriae or common community?9
This case appears to be the first application in American law of the legal
doctrine of parens patrice, the state acting on behalf of the juvenile, which
began the development of the virtually unrestrained powers of later juvenile
courts.I°
L.J. 455, 456 (1993).
6. BARRY KRISBERG & JAMES AUSTIN, REINVENTING JUVENILE JUSTICE 8 (1993). See
also Robert W. Sweet, Jr., Deinstitutionalization of Status Offenders: In Perspective, 18
PEPP. L. REV. 389, 390 (1991).
7. Ohio authorized cities to establish houses of refuge in 1857. See 54 LAWS OF OHIO
163 (1857). Some years later, Ohio Supreme Court Justice William White observed that
Houses of Refuge were established "to place minors of the description [contained in the
statute], and for the causes specified in the statute, under the guardianship of the public
authorities named, for proper care and discipline, until they are reformed, or arrive at the age
of majority." Prescott v. Ohio, 19 Ohio St. 184, 188 (1869).
8. Exparte Crouse, 4 Whart. 9, 11 (Pa. 1839) (per curiam).
9. Ex parte Crouse involved a writ of habeas corpus directed to the manager of the House
of Refuge of Philadelphia County, requiring them to produce Mary Ann Crouse, who was
detained in the reformatory. The local Justice of the Peace committed Mary Ann Crouse
upon the complaint of her mother, who claimed Mary Ann was "by reason of vicious conduct"
beyond her mother's control, Id. at 9. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied the writ,
noting, "The infant has been snatched from a course which must have ended in confirmed
depravity; and, *not only is the restraint of her person lawful, but it would be an act of
extreme cruelty to release her from it." Id. at 11.
10. READER & SACKS, supra note 3, at 6. These early courts used a broad interpretation of
parens patrice to commit youth to the authority of the State. Chief Justice Ryan of the
Wisconsin Supreme Court accurately described the state's broad reach in The Milwaukee
Indus. Sch. v. Supervisors of Milwaukee County, noting:
[I]n the first place, we cannot understand that the detention of the child at one of these
schools should be considered as imprisonment, any more that its detention in the poor
house; any more than the detention of any child at any boarding school, standing, for
the time, in loco parentis to the child. Parental authority implies restraint, not
imprisonment. And every school must necessarily exercise some measure of the
parental power of restraint over children committed to it. And when the state, as
parens patriae, is compelled by the misfortune of a child to assume for it parental
[Vol. 29:3
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Illinois adopted the first juvenile code in 1899,11 which established the
country's first juvenile court and radically altered the way courts dealt with
children. 12 This early juvenile court imposed the then-overriding objective of
rehabilitation to resolve cases. The Illinois law focused on the offender's
character, rather than the nature of the offense, which was a reflection of and
response to the developing "Child Savers" movement. 3
Because the state's emphasis was on rehabilitation, and not punishment,
there was no need for the formal protection of due process. 4 Further devel-
duty, and to charge itself with its nurture, it is compelled also to assume parental
authority over it. This authority must necessarily be delegated to those to whom the
state delegates the nurture and education of the child. The state does not, indeed we
might say could not, intrude this assumption of authority between parent and child
standing in no need of it. It assumes it only upon the destitution and necessity of the
child, arising from want or default of parents. And, in exercising a wholesome parental
restraint over the child, it can be properly said to imprison the child, no more that the
tenderest parent exercising like power of restraint over children. This seems too plain
to need authority.
40 Wis. 328, 337-38 (1876). By 1881, the doctrine of parens patrie was well settled in Ohio.
Cincinnati House of Refuge v. Ryan, 37 Ohio St. 197, 204 (1881).
11. Illinois Juvenile Court Act, I1l. Laws 133 (1,899).
12. Stanley J. Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV.
1187, 1207-30 (1970) (discussing the state of juvenile justice in Illinois and nationally from
the mid-19th century up to and including enactment of the Illinois Juvenile Court Act).
13. Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense: Punishment,
Treatment, and the Difference it Makes, 68 B.U. L. REV. 821, 823-4 (1988). The Child
Savers were predominantly middle class Americans who operated under the auspices of
religious and civic organizations and sought to control and reduce juvenile crime, poverty,
idleness, and other undesirable conduct by setting up institutions. William S. Geimer, Ready
to Take to the High Road? The Case for Importing Scotland's Juvenile Justice System, 35
CATH. U. L. REV. 385, 388 (1986). The Child Savers saw a close connection between poverty,
crime and urban slum life and argued the State had both a right and duty to intervene in a bad
environment to save children from delinquency. Joel F. Hander, The Transformation of Aid
to Families with Dependent Children: The Family Support Act in Historical Context, 16
N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 457, 471(1988). Initially, the Child Savers favored breaking
up the home and separating children from their unfit parents. Id.
14. READER & SACKS, supra note 3, at 6. One commentator described the informal nature
of a juvenile proceeding reflecting the parens patrice philosophy: "The problem for
determination by the judge is not, Has this boy or girl committed a specific wrong, but What
is he, how has he become what he is, and what had best be done in his interest and in the
interest of the state to save him from a downward career." Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile
Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 119-20 (1909). A 1905 Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision
also explains the new juvenile court's role in rehabilitation:
To save a child from becoming a criminal, or from continuing in a career of crime, to
end in maturer years in public punishment and disgrace, the [l]egislatures surely may
provide for the salvation of such a child, if its parents or guardians be unable or unwilling
to do so, by bringing it into one of the courts of the state without any process at all, for
the purpose of subjecting it to the state's guardianship and protection.
Commonwealth v. Fisher, 62 A. 198, 200 (Pa. 1905).
Spring 19961
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opments based on this philosophy included informal, closed proceedings,
which resulted in sealed records to avoid stigmatization. As a result, dispo-
sitions evolved based on the medical model of diagnosing social ills. 16
During the 1920s, as the child guidance movement developed expertise,
professional and mental health services available through the courts were
expanded.' 7 Social workers and probation officers were now trained to divert
delinquents away from institutions deemed too restrictive. The courts were
given jurisdiction over children who committed adult crimes or who exhib-
ited non-criminal or status offense behavior." These status offenders included
truants, runaway youth, children beyond their parents' control, and those
deemed incorrigible.' 9 Moreover, courtroom proceedings had little to do with
law, and the lawyers' role was not prominent.20
A new era of juvenile justice began in the 1950s, due in part to the greater
mobility of juveniles, the growing problems of drug use, and the marked in-
crease in violent youth gangs. 21 Many segments of society became vulnerable,
and critics of the juvenile justice system became more vocal and organized.
Their potent attacks ranged from accusations of excessive judicial leniency
with violent offenders 22 to excessive harshness in depriving female status
offenders of liberties. 23 Other criticisms related to the stigmatization of
youths, discriminatory sentencing practices, and child abuse occurring in
juvenile correction facilities. 24 The major thrust for change came with the
15. Barry C. Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy: A Case Study of Juvenile Justice Law,
79 MINN. L. REV. 965, 971 (1995).
16. Michael L. Langley et al., The Juvenile Court and Individualized Treatment, 18 CRIME
& DELINQ. 79,81 (1972).
17. READER'& SACKS, supra note 3, at 6. See also Feld, supra note 13, at 824-25.
18. Id. at 825 n.12.
19. Id. See also Robison v. Wayne Circuit Judges, 115 N.W. 682, 683 (Mich. 1908); Hunt
v. Wayne Circuit Judges, 105 N.W. 531, 533 (Mich. 1905); State ex rel. Olson v. Brown, 52
N.W. 935, 936 (Minn. 1892); People v. Glowacki, 22 N.Y.S.2d 22, 24 (N.Y. Super. Ct.
1940).
20. See Feld, supra note 15, at 968.
21. READER & SACKS, supra note 3, at 7. See also David R. Truman, Note, The Jets and
Sharks are Dead: State Statutory Responses to Criminal Street Gangs, 73 WASH. U. L.Q.
683, 693-94 (1995) (discussing the history of gangs in the United States).
22. See Mark E. Bellamy, Review of Selected 1994 California Legislation, 26 PAC. L.J.
480 (1994).
23. Cheryl Dalby, Gender Bias Toward Status Offenders: A Paternalistic Agenda Carried
Out Through the JJDPA, 12 LAW & INEQ. J. 429, 438-40 (1994) (discussing female status
offenders and deprivations of liberty).
24. See, e.g., Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575, 586 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (discussing the
deplorable conditions of New York's juvenile detention facilities in the context of the Eighth
Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment, specifically noting instances of abuse
occurring within the facilities).
[Vol. 29:3
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belief that the treatment model deterring delinquency had failed, and the ju-
venile court had not fulfilled its promise.2" The decline in the era of rehabili-
tation had begun.
The pendulum began its swing and never stopped at the bottom. The
United States Supreme Court's decision in Kent v. United States took note of
the juvenile justice system's shortcomings.26 In Kent, Justice Fortas wrote,
"There may be grounds for concern that the child receives the worst of both
worlds; that he gets neither the protection accorded to adults, nor the solici-
tous care and regenerative treatment postulated for children."27 A few years
later, In re Gault2" established an innovative reform by holding that juveniles
were entitled to the same procedural due process protections accorded adults,
to wit, the right to counsel;2 9 the right to notice of specific charges; 30 the right
to confront and cross examine witnesses; the right to remain silent; and the
right to subpoena witnesses in defense. 31
Not long thereafter, an activist Supreme Court promulgated additional
procedural protections in In re Winship.32 In re Winship provided that guilt
must be proven "beyond a reasonable doubt" in juvenile proceedings. 33 Fol-
lowing these constitutional expansions, juvenile courts were bound by defined
legal standards, as well as an existing social welfare philosophy - which are
not always mutually inclusive obligations. The debate continued.
In the 1960s, when we hung out our dirty wash as a nation and social
activism and permissiveness were on the rise, the country saw activism among
legislative bodies. By July 1974, Congress enacted the Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention Act, 34 which allocated funds for programs that em-
phasized community-based treatment and prevention. It established the of-
25. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555 (1966). See also Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-
Imagining Childhood and Reconstructing the Legal Order: The Case for Abolishing the
Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1083, 1104-06 (1991) (discussing the rejection of parens
patriae and the implementation of the "just desserts" septencing model in juvenile courts as a
result of the juvenile courts' institutional failures to rehtabilitate delinquents); Knipps, supra
note 3, at 457.
26. Kent, 383 U.S. at 555-56.
27. Id. at 556.
28. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
29. Id. at 34-42.
30. Id. at 31-34.
31. Id. at 42-56.
32. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
33. In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 368. These constitutional expansions temporarily halted in
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971), where the Court refused to extend the
right to trial by jury to juvenile proceedings.
34. Pub. L. No. 93-415, 88 Stat. 1109 (1974) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5601 (1994)).
Spring 1996]
5
Reader: The Laws of Unintended Results
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1996
AKRON LAW REVIEW
fice of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention to oversee these pro-
grams.3 5 This influential legislation, which called for decriminalization,
deinstitutionalization, and the elimination of court authority over status of-
fenders, created a furor.3 6 There were those who believed that the courts'
authority was essential in dealing with status offenders, but this new approach
was hailed by the civil libertarians, who advocated the separation of criminal
and non-criminal youth in juvenile court.3 7 The debate also continued over
deinstitutionalization and closing down juvenile correctional facilities, which
some advocated replacing with smaller, more open local facilities.
Federal incentives were inadequate to induce the states to-implement
these legislative reforms. However, many states nonetheless enacted enabling
legislation to receive what little federal monies were available. What this
legislation really said was, "Parents, you owe to your children the duty to care
for, protect, house, feed, and educate." Then we said to the child, "You don't
have to obey your parents, you don't have to go to school, you don't have to
stay at home, and there is no one that can make you do any of these things."
When the court lost its authority over status offenders, buttressed by the free-
dom cry of the sixties, we saw an explosion of runaways in the seventies and
eighties.
A zealous preoccupation by the administrators of the Office of Juvenile
Justice was forcing states and communities to accept and implement untested,
unproven, and costly theories, which created havoc in the administration of
juvenile justice throughout the seventies. Recent research suggests these
policies were disruptive, counter-productive, and to a large extent unneces-
sary.38 It appears that the modus operandi of the Office of Juvenile Justice was
the following:
We have a theory. We believe it is correct. You states and cities must
accept it, or you will not get any federal money. If you accept it, we Feds
will pay for a small part of the cost of your programs. We will also pay
for research that demonstrates that we were right. Now we are told by
researchers that we were wrong, or they still don't know if we were right.
But, you still have to do it our way if you want the money.
35. 42 U.S.C. § 5611 (1994). The agency was established within the U.S. Department of
Justice under the authority of the Attorney General.
36. See Sweet, supra note 6, at 405.
37. See Jan C. Costello & Nancy L. Worthington, Incarcerating Status Offenders: Attempts
to Circumvent the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 41 (1981) (asserting that "youth advocates" push state courts to strictly adhere to the
JJDPA).
38. See NAT'L ADVISORY COMM. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SERIOUS JUVENILE CRIME: A REDIRECTED FEDERAL EFFORT (March
1984).
[Vol. 29:3
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As more and more children were leaving home or running away, the cry
went out that a million children a year were being kidnapped. Pictures of
youth appeared on milk cartons throughout the country, and it did not take
long for this idea of kidnapping to be shot down. Research indicated that less
than one-half of one percent were being kidnapped, and that the balance were
running away from either an abusive home, or seeking "freedom." Runaway
youth migrated to our major metropolitan cities, where they were sexually
abused, ended up in prostitution, or became involved in pornography.
During the 1980 reauthorization of the Juvenile Justice Act, the National
Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges, together with the Ohio Asso-
ciation of Juvenile Court Judges, sponsored the "Valid Court Order" amend-
ment, which was carried by Representative John Ashbrook of Ohio.39 For
those states who had not abandoned the status offender, this gave the status
offender one bite out of the apple before being treated in some cases as a
delinquent." In addition, the National Advisory Committee, reviewing the
work of the Office of Juvenile Justice asserted that the office had no theory
of delinquency causation.4 Further, Congress recommended that the office
should become more involved with the serious offender problem and that the
39. Pub. L. No. 96-509, 94 Stat. 2757 § 11(a)(13) (1980) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
5633(a)(12)(A) (1994)). This measure was passed and became law on December 8, 1980. Id.
See also H.R. REP. No. 946, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., at 27 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6098, 6114. The valid court order amendment provides in part:
[T]o receive formula grants under this part, a State shall submit a plan ... provid[ing]
within three years after submission of the initial plan that juveniles who are charged
with or who have committed offenses that would not be criminal if committed by an
adult or offenses (other than an offense that constitutes violation of a valid court order
or a violation of section 922(x) of Title 18 or a similar State law) . . . shall not be
placed in secure detention facilities or secure correctional facilities.
42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(12)(A)(1994) (emphasis added). Under the valid court order provision,
when a juvenile violates a court order, the judge may place the child in a detention facility.
Dalby, supra note 23, at 441-45.
40. The majority of courts having addressed the issue of whether a juvenile judge can
incarcerate a status offender have held that a status offender may be incarcerated when found
in contempt of a valid court order, so long as the juvenile has notice and an opportunity to
comply with the order, violation of the order is egregious, less restrictive alternatives were
considered but found to be ineffective, and special confinement restrictions are made to prevent
intermingling with delinquents. In Interest of D.L.D., 327 N.W.2d 682, 689 (Wis. 1983);
accord In re Michael G., 747 P.2d 1152, 1161 (Cal. 1988); J.E.S., 817 P.2d 508, 512-513
(Colo. 1991); In Interest of Darlene C., 301 S.E.2d 136, 138 (S.C. 1983). The Ohio Supreme
Court has not addressed this issue, but in a thoughtful dissent, Justice Wright argued that
Ohio should follow In the Interest of D.L.D. and the majority of other courts in determining
whether a juvenile can be adjudged delinquent for violating a valid court order. In re Trent,
539 N.E.2d 630 (Ohio 1989) (Wright, J., dissenting).
41. See NAT'L ADVISORY COMM. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION,
supra note 38, at 7-8.
Spring 1996]
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office should stop contributing to the demise of the family. 2 The pendulum
started swinging the other way.
In 1984, the National Advisory Committee for Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention sharply criticized the previous policy initiative of
deinstitutionalization and diversion. The Committee argued for a new federal
focus on serious juvenile offenders, with emphasis on deterrence, fixed sen-
tencing, and incarceration of youth. State legislatures responded by passing
laws allowing juveniles to be transferred to adult courts.43
In addition to this wave of "get tough" legislation, the United States
Supreme Court's majority opinion in Schall v. Martin "was a clear indication
of a more restrictive attitude toward children's rights. Writing for the Court,
Chief Justice Rehnquist recognized that "the juvenile's liberty interest may,
in appropriate circumstances, be subordinated to the State's parens patriae
interest in preserving and promoting the welfare of the child."45 Conse-
quently, the Court held that preventive detention of juveniles before trial was
a legitimate state action to prevent pre-trial crimes.4 6
No great leap is required to realize the public has a stake in what happens
to young people. It expects children to be educated, which means that they
should not drop out of school. It expects children to be healthy, not to become
alcoholics before they are old enough to drive. It expects children to be con-
trolled until they learn self-control, which means that they should not run the
streets at night. It expects children to adhere to a moral code, at least to the
extent of not producing their own children while still going through adoles-
cence themselves. No segment of the public, other than a few professors and
other fuzzy-headed social theorists have been heard to say that compulsory
education laws should be repealed, as they would effectively be if truancy
jurisdiction were eliminated; or that children should not obey their parents as
they could if incorrigibility jurisdiction were eliminated; or that children
should be allowed to smoke and drink to their hearts' content, as they might
if possession and consumption of cigarettes and alcohol were no longer un-
lawful for children.
In 1984, the Metropolitan Court's Committee of the National Council of
Juvenile and Family Court Judges published thirty-eight recommendations
relative to the serious offenders. It is interesting to note that this Committee
was composed of the presiding judges of thirty of the largest metropolitan
42. Id. at 9-10.
43. E.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-34 (1995); IDAHO CODE § 20-508 (1995); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2151.26 (Baldwin 1995).
44. 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
45. Id. at 265 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
46. Id. at 274.
[Vol. 29:3
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areas in our country, wherein more than one-half of the serious juvenile vio-
lent crimes were being committed. This author suggests that if these recom-
mendations had been implemented by legislation, we would not be facing the
problems that we are today. Moreover, this point is particularly significant
when one realizes the seeds of this problem were sown in the permissive six-
ties and carried through into the seventies and eighties.
As we move toward the end of the century, the pendulum is still moving
and laws are being passed, I submit, that will produce unintended results.
Toward this end, we must ask ourselves, "Are we so enamored with the suc-
cesses of the adult prison system that we now send youth directly to an adult
prison based on the offense, rather than individualized justice?" Such is the
impact of legislation recently passed by the Ohio General Assembly, to wit,
Amended Substitute House Bill I, wherein juveniles may be transferred
directly to the adult criminal court for prosecution based upon certain charged
offenses. 48
This legislation establishes offense categories. Category One Offenses
are: aggravated murder; attempted aggravated murder; murder; and, at-
tempted murder. 49 Category Two Offenses are: kidnapping; rape; voluntary
manslaughter; involuntary manslaughter (Fl); felonious sexual penetration;
aggravated arson; aggravated robbery; and aggravated burglary.50 A youth
would be automatically bound over if one of the following applies: 1) the
youth is fourteen years or older, has committed a felony offense, and has
previously pleaded guilty or was convicted of a felony level offense in an
adult court; or 2) the youth is fourteen years or older, has committed a felony
offense, and is a resident of another state where he or she would be considered
an adult; or 3) the youth is sixteen or seventeen years old and has been charged
with a Category One Offense, or the youth is fourteen or fifteen years old, has
committed a Category One Offense and has previously been committed to the
Ohio Department of Youth Services for a Category One or Category Two
Offense; or 4) the youth is sixteen or seventeen years old, has committed a
Category One or Two Offense (except kidnapping) and has previously been
committed to the Ohio Department of Youth Services for a Category One or
Two Offense; or 5) the youth is sixteen or seventeen years old, has commit-
ted a Category Two Offense (except kidnapping), and displayed, brandished,
47. Am. Sub. H.B. 1, 121st Ohio General Assembly, Reg. Sess., (1995). The provisions of
this bill went into effect on January 1, 1996. Id.
48. Am. Sub. H.B. 1 § 1.
49. Am. Sub. H.B. 1 § 1 (codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.26(A)(1)(a)-(b) (Baldwin
1995)).
50. Am. Sub. H.B. 1 § 1 (codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.26(A)(2)(a)-(b) (Baldwin
1995)).
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indicated possession, or used a firearm during the commission of the act."
Should any of the above be found by way of probable cause, the court will
transfer the juvenile without an amenability hearing.5 2
This legislation allows the juvenile court to transfer a youth fourteen
years old or older who has committed a felony offense to the adult court.53 As
part of this process, the court must consider certain conditions in favor of
transfer.54 In addition, minimum sentences are provided for youth who com-
mit certain acts.55 For example, youths who have committed a Category Two
Offense (except aggravated burglary) must serve a minimum of one to three
years.
5 6
The same day the Ohio General Assembly passed House Bill 1, it also
passed Senate Bill 2, which is an adult sentencing bill that is six hundred
seventy-eight pages long. 7 This bill becomes effective July 1, 1996, and
51. Am. Sub. H.B. No. 1 § 1 (codified at Olo REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.26(B) (Baldwin
1995)).
52. Id.
53. Am. Sub. H.B. 1 § 1 (codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.26 (C)(1) (Baldwin
1995)).
54. Am. Sub. H.B. 1 § 1 (codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.26(C)(2) (Baldwin
1995)) provides in part:
(C)(2) When determining whether to order the transfer of a case for criminal
prosecution to the appropriate court having jurisdiction of the offense pursuant to
division (C)(1) of this section, the court shall consider all of the following factors in
favor of ordering the transfer of the case:(a) A victim of the act charged was five years
of age or younger, regardless of whether the child who is alleged to have committed
that act knew the age of that victim;
(b) A victim of the act charged sustained physical harm to the victim's person
during the commission of or otherwise as a result of the act charged.
(c) The child is alleged to have had a firearm on or about the child's person or
under the child's control while committing the act charged and to have displayed the
firearm, brandished the firearm, indicated possession of the firearm, or used the firearm
to facilitate the commission of the act charged, other than a violation of section
2923.12 of the Revised Code.
(d) The child who is alleged to have committed the act charged has a history
indicating a failure to be rehabilitated following one or more commitments pursuant to
division (A)(3),(4),(5),(6), or (7) of section 2151.355 of the Revised Code.
(e) A victim of the act charged was sixty-five years of age or older or permanently
and totally disabled at the time of the commission of the act charged, regardless of
whether the child who is alleged to have committed that act knew the age of that
victim.
55. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.355 (A)(4)-(5) (eff. until 6-31-96); see also OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2151.355 (A)(4)-(5) (1996) (eff. 7-1-96).
56. Compare OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2151.355(5)(a) (Baldwin 1995) with OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2151.26(A)(2) (Baldwin 1995) (defining category two offenses)).
57. S.B. 2, 121st Ohio General Assembly, Reg. Sess., (1995).
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effectively repeals the transfer section, the definitional section, and the dis-
positional sections of House Bill 1.58 Moreover, Juvenile Rule 30, entitled
"Relinquishment of Jurisdiction for Purposes of Criminal Prosecution" 9 has
not been modified, vacated, or repealed, so it remains uncertain whether ju-
venile courts can proceed according to the rule instead of the new statutory
provisions.
60
House Bill 1 and similar legislation are based on the perception that
juveniles are responsible for most of the violent crime being committed in this
country. The National Center for Juvenile Justice, under a grant from the
Office of Juvenile Justice, published Juvenile Offenders and Victims: A Na-
tional Report, detailing juvenile crime statistics. 6' In this report, there are two
important sets of statistics. Using the National Crime Victimization Survey,
it was found that juveniles committed nineteen percent of the crimes of vio-
58. Compare Am. Sub. H.B. 1 § 1, 121st Ohio General Assembly, Reg. Sess., (1995) with
S.B. No. 2, 121st Ohio General Assembly, Reg. Sess., (1995) §§ 2151.011, 2151.26 & 2151.27.
It is certain that corrective legislation will be introduced to rectify this error, but it is submitted
that this is a further indication of the "knee jerk" reaction to a purported problem that simply
does not exist to the extent reported in the national media.
59. OHIO R. Juv. P. 30.
60. OHIO R. Juv. P. 30(D), Prerequisites to Transfer, provides:
The proceedings may be transferred [to criminal court] if the court finds there are
reasonable grounds to believe both of the following:
(1) The child is not amenable to care or rehabilitation in any facility designed
for the care, supervision, and rehabilitation of delinquent children;
(2) The safety of the community may require that the child be placed under
legal restraint for a period extending beyond the child's majority.
OHIO R. Juv. P. 30. The Rules of Juvenile Procedure also provide a balancing test for the
court to follow in determining amenability to rehabilitation. OHIO R. Juv. P. 30(F) provides:
In determining whether the child is amenable to the treatment or rehabilitative process
available to the juvenile court, the court shall consider the following relevant
circumstances:
(1) The child's age and mental and physical condition;
(2) The child's prior juvenile record;
(3) Efforts previously made to treat or rehabilitate the child:
(4) The child's family environment;
(5) The child's school record;
(6) The specific facts relating to the offense for which probable cause was found,
to the extent relevant to the child's physical or mental condition.
OHIO R. Juv. P. 30(F).
61. HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELLISSA SICKMUND, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE ANT
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lence. 62 Persons most likely to be victimized by juveniles were individuals
between ages twelve and nineteen. 63 In contradistinction, juveniles were
seldom the offender in crimes against older victims. 64 For example, seven
percent of robberies of "persons ages twenty to thirty-four were committed by
juveniles, and victims above age fifty rarely reported they were robbed by
juveniles. 65
The second source of information addressing the relative volume of
crime committed by juveniles and adults comes from the Federal Bureau of
Investigation. In 1991, The FBI reported only "eleven percent of all violent
crimes, i.e., murder, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault, were
cleared by the arrest of a person under age eighteen. '66 Juveniles were also
arrested in only twenty-two percent of all cleared property crime, i.e., bur-
glary, larceny, motor vehicle theft, and arson.67
This report also found that although juveniles were responsible for a
disproportionate share of the increase in violent crime, it was not accurate to
say that juveniles were driving the violent crime train. In fact, adults were
responsible for seventy percent of the recent increase in violent crime.68
Therefore, juveniles were responsible for thirty percent of the violent crime
increase between those same years.
Is it possible to project the increase in juvenile violent crime for the next
ten to fifteen years? Estimates vary widely, but it is reasonable to assume that
it will increase, and possibly increase dramatically. However, in this quest for
statistical certainty, we must not lose sight of the method by which we collect
our samples. For example, a juvenile judge presiding in a small county who
committed four juveniles in 1994 and eight in 1995 increased his commitment
rate one hundred percent. Conversely, a juvenile judge in a larger county who
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: A
NATIONAL REPORT (Aug. 1995). See also Ira M. Schwartz et al., Public Attitudes Toward
Juvenile Crime and Juvenile Justice: Implications for Public Policy, 13 HAMLINE J. PUB. L.
& POL'Y 241, 248 (1992) (detailing public perception of serious juvenile crime increases).
62. See SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 61, at 47.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 48.
67. Id. Could this statistic be the reason that aggravated burglary was excepted out of the
minimum sentencing under HR 1? A possible reason for the difference between the two
reporting authorities is that adult crimes are more serious and therefore more likely to be
reported. If this is true, the differential reporting would make the juvenile contribution to
crime smaller from law enforcement's perspective than from the victims' perspective.
68. Id. at 110.
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commits fifty in 1994 and seventy-five in 1995 increased his commitment rate
by only fifty percent.
The national media has, as is their fashion, taken the percentages of
increase and the projections of increase, and headlined them. Politicians, as
is their fashion, have reacted by passing laws that are punitive and punishment
oriented, replacing the individualized justice that has been the heart of the
juvenile system in the past. Thus, Ohio adopted House Bill 1, referred to
earlier, which retains judicial discretion but also adds statutory exclusion
depending upon the juvenile's age and offense. Will it reduce violent juve-
nile crime? Only time will tell. However, the experience in other states in-
dicates that mandatory transfer does not impact violent crime. For example,
New York and Florida have had statutory exclusion for many years, and re-
ports indicate that their juvenile crime increase exceeded the national aver-
age. 69 Moreover, in 1992 New York, Florida, New Jersey, Maryland, and
California, respectively, had the highest juvenile violent crime arrest rates. 70
It is a sad commentary that many youths will end up in adult jails with
little or no hope of a rehabilitative effort. The juvenile justice system has been
the step-child of the criminal justice system since its inception. A common
sense approach to crime indicates the best opportunity to prevent crime is to
deter it.7 In the past, juvenile judges and juvenile justice professionals have
been given the impossible task of habilitating or rehabilitating juvenile of-
fenders without the wherewithal to do so.
A few years ago, I appeared before a Senate Committee testifying on
behalf of the reauthorization of the Juvenile Justice Act. The chairman of that
committee remarked publicly that children do not vote and children do not
have PACS, and therefore their voice is not too loud in the halls of Congress.
Is it too late to hope the anti-system advocates, with their untested theories,
the members of the Ohio General Assembly, juvenile judges, and juvenile
justice professionals can sit down and determine the best approach to the
problem? There is no need for studies because the juvenile courts have been
studied to death. What is needed is a cooperative effort and money. It has
been said that our children constitute twenty-five percent of our population
and one hundred percent of our future. There is no quick fix and no sure
answer, but I submit that House Bill 1 is not the total answer.
69. HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELLISSA SICKMUND, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS - A
Focus ON VIOLENCE 4 (May 1995).
70. Id.
71. George Bundy Smith & Gloria M. Dabiri, The Judicial Role in the Treatment of Juvenile
Delinquents, 3 J.L. & POL'Y 347, 366 (1995) (arguing the key to preventing juvenile crime
may lie not in rehabilitation, but in "risk-focused prevention").
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